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The Incarnation of the Lord Jesus Christ in the Writings  




Jesus Christ is the central object of the Church’s faith. He is also the object of 
Christology. Christology is the study of what Christian faith teaches about the mystery of Christ 
(who he is) and His work of redemption (what he did, i.e. soteriology). Christology begins with 
faith and infallibly affirms the truth of who He is which then affirms the truth about everything 
He said. “It is one of the key areas of theology and constitutes the study, in light of faith, of 
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what that faith teaches regarding the mystery of Christ and his work of redemption.”1 It is 
important to begin with faith, which is the belief that Jesus is divine, and then apply reason to 
explain this belief. In a certain way, “the profession of faith that Jesus is the Christ is a resume 
of the Christian faith, and Christology is nothing other than the theological development of the 
content of that profession.”2 It is something that God has revealed to us, although our human 
minds can never completely understand it. As Richard of St. Victor states in his work, Trinity and 
Creation,  
There are some of those truths (the divine substance) which we are ordered to 
believe seem to be not only above reason but also contrary to human reason, 
unless they are scrutinized with a profound and very subtle investigation, or 
rather, unless they are revealed by divine revelation. And so, in the knowledge or 
assertion of those truths we usually rely more on faith than on reasoning, and 
authority rather than argumentation, just as the prophet said: unless you believe, 
you will not understand. 3  
 
Although the object of faith is always something unseen, it is a necessary mode of knowing 
because of our epistemological limitations. Thus faith precedes knowledge. Believing is 
seeing—we must first believe to truly see.  
The study of the Mystery of Christ is similar to the study of other theological mysteries; 
we must first study what faith teaches about this mystery. The study of Christology must start 
with faith, the belief that Jesus Christ is truly God and truly man. This is a theological 
development of the truths expressed in the Creed about Him. We can't claim that historical 
research is above what faith tells us about the mystery of the  Incarnation of our Lord Jesus 
                                                        
1 Fernando Ocáriz, Lucas F. Mateo Seco, and José Antonio Riestra, The Mystery of Jesus Christ: A 
Christology and Soteriology Textbook, (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1994), p. 1. 
2 Ibid, p. 2. 
3 Richard of St. Victor, On Trinity and Creation, Introduction and Translation by Christopher P. 
Evans, (Hyde Park, N.Y. : New City Press, 2010), p. 213. 
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Christ. Also, we cannot claim through historical research alone that he is the way, the truth, and 
the life (John 14:6). As Ocáriz, Seco, and Riestra say concerning the mystery of Christ, “we 
should always remember that by itself alone, historical research in never sufficient to give one 
complete knowledge of the mystery of Christ, because true knowledge of Jesus implies 
believing that he is the Son of God.”4 Likewise, Walter Kasper concurs, “theological study must 
not  start out from such a “critique of pure reason,” but from the New Testament evidence, 
according to which God has revealed to us his innermost nature and mystery in an 
eschatological- definitive way in Jesus Christ.”5 This means that, for faith, there is no dark 
mystery of God ‘behind’ his revelation. God in fact reveals himself in Jesus Christ unreservedly 
and definitively as the one who he is. 
Any doctrine of the mystery of the Incarnation of Jesus Christ, therefore, “cannot aim at 
being a perfect comprehension of God. It is not a definition that confines a thing to the 
pigeonholes of human knowledge, nor is it a concept that would put the thing within the grasp 
of the human mind.”6 Moreover, an authentic understanding of the mystery of Christ only takes 
place within the Church since she has passed on the faith about the Incarnation of our Lord. 
Although we can never completely understand the mystery of Christ, we can come to a deeper 
understanding by learning more about this fundamental doctrine of the Christian faith. 
However, the Church has never ceased studying and contemplating this mystery in order to 
help her children better understand and believe in it because the Mystery of Incarnation, a- 
                                                        
4 Ocáriz, Seco, and Riestra, The Mystery of Jesus Christ, p. 6. 
5 Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, (London ; New York : T & T Clark, 2011), p. 169. 
6 Cardinal Ratzinger Joseph (Pope Benedict XVI), Introduction to Christianity, trans by J.R. Foster 
and Michael J. Miller with a new Preface, (Ignatius Press, 2004), p. 171. 
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long- side the mystery of the Trinity, is the central mystery of the Christian faith. This objective 
faith of the Church is what one believes about God and His plan of salvation. As a Dogmatic 
Constitution produced at the Second Vatican Council, Dei verbum, refers to revelation by the 
phrase "the Word of God" that primarily this Word of God is the eternal Son, the Second Person 
of the Trinity, who for us and our salvation, assumed a human nature.7 Ocáriz, Seco, and Riestra 
concur, “the fact that Christ Jesus is God and man; he is one subject, one person, subsisting in 
two natures, divine and human, He who is God and Man. The oneness in Jesus has always been 
a presupposition in the Church’s faith regarding the humanity and divinity of our Lord.”8 The 
essence of the mystery of the Incarnation is the hypostatic union, which the Council of 
Chalcedon defined as the union of the two real natures, human and divine, in the one person of 
the Logos. The Chalcedonian dogma solemnly confirms that Christ is the Son of God, true God 
who truly became man. One and the same Christ, our Lord and Savior, is indeed God and man.  
When we speak of “Christology” in Aquinas, we mean what Aquinas typically calls “the 
mystery of the Incarnation” (mysterium incarnationis), which he identifies as the most excellent 
of all mysteries.9 St. Thomas Aquinas is regarded as the greatest of all medieval Christian 
thinkers. He thinks as a Christian, and uses his ability to think in a way which, in his view, does 
all that it can to show that the revelation given in Christianity is not merely a creed for those 
                                                        
7 Vatican Council II: “Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation: Dei Verbum,” Pope Paul VI, On 
November 18, 1965, n.7, accessed at: www.vatican.va › documents › vat-
ii_const_19651118_dei-verbum_en. 
8 Ocáriz, Seco, and Riestra, The Mystery of Jesus Christ, p. 90. 
9 Daniel A. Keating, “Exegesis And Christology in Thomas Aquinas,” Reading Sacred Scripture 
with Thomas Aquinas: Hermeneutical Tools, Theological Questions and New Perspectives. 
Edited by Piotr Roszak and Jörgen Vijgen (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2015), Book chapter, p. 
507-530, p. 507. 
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who cannot give reasons for what they believe.10 The Summa’s ‘treatise’ on Christ is in three 
parts (tertia pars) and contains fifty nine questions. The tertia pars aspires to 
comprehensiveness in Christological topics addressed, and in organization and writing, display 
considerable skill.11 The Christology of the tertia pars is a masterful achievement, a testimony 
to Aquinas’ lifelong encounter with Christ, his fidelity to Scripture and to the theological 
traditions of both West and East, and his skill as a theologian, intent on teaching Christ most 
adequately.12  
St. Thomas begins with the Incarnation, since “the fundamental cause of all human 
salvation is God’s entering into human life in Jesus Christ.13 Aquinas gives careful account of the 
classical doctrines of the hypostatic union and has a number of reasons  for holding these 
views. In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas divides his Christology according to three major 
themes: Ontology, Christ’s ‘psychology’, and the mysteries of the life of Christ.14 He treated his 
Christology according to the central theme of ontology, or the being of Christ (who he is - quis). 
Aquinas begins with faith, the belief that Jesus is the Word (Logos) of God, a divine person 
whose being subsists in two natures, divine and human. But how are the two natures of Christ 
united in the one person of the Word (in the hypostasis), and why is Christ a true man but not a 
                                                        
10 Samuel George, “the Hypostatic Union of Jesus Christ in the Writing of Thomas Aquinas: An 
Enquiry.” A doctoral Student in the department of Christian Theology at United Theological 
College, Bangalore. Theological Forum Bangalore Theological Forum, XL, n. 1 (June 2008), 1185-
184. (ISSN: 0253-9365), p. 121. 
11 Joseph P. Wawrykow, “Christology of Thomas Aquinas in its Scholastic Context,” (Oxford 
University Press, 2015), book chapter 15, p. 233. 
12 Ibid., p. 233. 
13 Shawn Bawulski and Stephen R. Holmes, “Christian Theology: Classics,” (Taylor and Francis 
Group, 2014), p. 74. 
14 Gilbert Narcisse, O.P., “Christ According to Saint Thomas,” Nova et Vetera, Enghlish Edition of 
International Theological Journal, Vol. 8, No.4 (2010): 813-826, p. 817. 
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human person? Thomas offers numerous illuminating explanations of this dogma.15 He also 
often mentions that the mystery of the ‘hypostatic union’ largely exceeds anything that the 
theologian can say. His Christology in its simplest definition means the study of the person and 
work of Jesus Christ. For him, Christ is the starting point. Everything he has to say about Christ is 
an attempt to explore the sense and significance of what he understands  to be the teaching of 
Chalcedon.16 Thomas is orthodox in his teaching about Christ from that point of view. “He 
accepts without qualification the doctrine of the Incarnation laid down by the Council of  
Chalcedon” 17 because “it gave what was the clearest and most systematic formulation to date 
of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation.”18  It is noted that St Thomas as a teacher 
summarized the principle conclusions about Christ offered by the Christian traditions in 
theology that preceded him, especially that of the patristic age. 
Following the basic points of St. Thomas’ thought concerning the hypostatic union of 
Christ, this thesis will give a brief account of the theory of Thomas’ hypostatic union which 
describes the unity of Christ. First, I will focus on historical Christology, which is concerned with 
the unity of the humanity and divinity of Christ. It considers some of the heresies concerning 
this topic, and how the Fathers of the Church and the various church ecumenical councils 
responded to these heresies in defense of the two natures in the one person of Jesus Christ. 
Second, I will show how the two natures have come together in the one person of Jesus Christ. I 
                                                        
15 Ibid., 817. 
16 Bawulski and Holmes, “Christian Theology: Classics,” p.74. 
17 George, “The Hypostatic Union of Jesus Christ in the Writing of Thomas Aquinas: An Enquiry,” 
p. 123. 
18  Michael Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, (Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), p. 3. 
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will then  focus on Saint Thomas’ theory of the hypostatic union and explain the orthodox 
teaching of why Christ has a human nature but is not a human person. The last chapter is an 
examination of Saint Thomas’ perspective on the purpose of the Incarnation and its 
eschatological significance: Christ’s restoration of man’s imago Dei is the fulfillment of man’s 
ultimate end.  
Chapter one 
The Historical Christology: The Issues of the Unity of the Humanity and Divinity 
of Christ. 
 
Saint Thomas knew well the Christological teachings of the great ecumenical councils. 
He always applied himself to the task of making them intelligible, especially the teaching of the 
Council of Chalcedon, which defined the dogma of Christ as one divine person subsisting in two 
natures: divine and human. Thomas attained a deeper understanding of the mystery of Christ 
with the help of many citations from the Fathers of the Church. Wawrykow, in his work with  
Christology of Thomas Aquinas in its Scholastic Context, says that “Aquinas’ Christology is 
incarnational, explicitly in conformity with what has been determined by the Church Councils  
of Ephesus, Chalcedon, and Constantinople II and III.”19 Moreover, Aquinas did not ignore 
heresies. He explains that the theologian should know not only the truth of his discipline but 
also the errors.20 Before considering  St. Thomas Aquinas’ theory of the hypostatic union, I will 
address, in response to heresies, the orthodox teachings of the fathers of the Church, and a 
number of the great Ecumenical Councils which defined the unity of Christ’s divine and human 
                                                        
19 Wawrykow, “Christology of Thomas Aquinas in its Scholastic Context”, p. 233. 
20 Dominic Legge, O.P., The Trinitarian of Christology of St Thomas Aquinas, (Oxford, United 
Kingdom ; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 103. 
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nature. It will be primarily ontological, a treatment focused on Christ's being (who he is) as 
opposed to soteriological (what he did). 
Nestorianism and the Council of Ephesus (431)  
It is thought that Aquinas carefully read (in Latin) the councils of Ephesus, Chalcedon, and 
Constantinople II and III. As a result he became sensitive to the importance of Cyril’s single - 
subject Christology and he then developed a more focused analysis and critique of 
Nestorianism as a form of heterodoxy.21 The development of Christological doctrine in the early 
Church can only be understood in the light of this background of theological history.22 In the 
fifth century other doctrinal disputes arose that included concerns about divine impassibility 
and the unicity of Christ’s person. This was the controversy between Nestorius, patriarch of 
Constantinople, and Saint Cyril, patriarch of Alexandria, leading to the teaching of the Council of 
Ephesus (431).23 The controversy between Nestorius and Cyril raised the fundamental question 
of the unity in Christ in connection with a practical challenge of using proper theological 
language. The question was whether the Logos is the one subject or whether the unity in Christ 
continues a tertium quid made up of Godhead and humanity.24  
Nestorius was the Patriarch of Constantinople in 428. Educated in the school of Antioch, he 
was influenced by the ideas of Theodore of Mopsuestia. Nestorius emphasized the two natures 
                                                        
21 Thomas Joseph White, OP, The Incarnation of the Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology, 
(Washington, D.C. : Catholic University of America Press, 2015), p.78. 
22 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, p. 223. 
23 Robin Ryan, CP, “God and the Mystery of Human Suffering: A Theological Conversation Across 
the Ages,” (Paulist Press New York/Mahwah, NJ, 2013), p. 100. 
24 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, p. 223. 
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in Christ, two subjects each subsistent in itself, and two persons.25 But he objected to 
attributing the properties of human nature to the divine person because it implies that God is 
somehow passable. An authentic human experience would have been impossible if his divinity 
were fused with his humanity. The two natures remain unmixed, and each retains its own 
properties and operation. Each of the two natures had its own prosopon (a synonym for 
hypostasis/ person/ subject). He was trying to say that each nature was objectively real, but the 
term Nestorius uses implies that there are separate subjects in Christ. In other words, there is in 
Christ, according to Nestorius, a divine person (The Word) and a human person (Jesus the man), 
but they are so closely linked to one another that in practice it is as if there were only one 
person: they constitute a kind of united person. It is not a matter of there being just a man in 
whom God dwells, but something between that and a physical and substantial union.26 Also, it 
logically leads Nestorius to deny Mary the title of “Mother of God” because she would only be 
the mother of man, a human person, though one specially united (“assumed”) by the union of 
the person (union prosopon) to the divine person of the Word.27 Nestorius was asked whether 
or not it is correct to call Mary "God-bearer" (Theotokos). He said no, she was "Christ bearer" 
(Christotokos). God could never have a mother; no creature can give birth to the creator. This 
implies that there is a separate subject in Jesus: God and "the Christ". But Mary did not 
generate the divine nature, she generated the human nature which belongs to God. Nestorius 
presumes that a unity of hypostatic subsistence implies a unity of nature, and vice versa.28 
                                                        
25 Ocáriz, Seo, and Riestra, The Mystery of Jesus Christ, p. 91. 
26 Ibid., p. 91. 
27 Ibid., p. 91. 
28 White, The Incarnation of the Lord: A Thomistic Study in Christology, p. 80. 
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Nestorius thought that because he just reasoned Jesus as two subjects that separated each 
other. 
Saint Cyril learned of Nestorius' heresy and stated that it sounded like Nestorius held that 
there are two separate subjects in Christ that are unified by a moral union. Cyril responded by 
describing the union as hypostatic: the union of the two natures took place in the one 
hypostasis of the Logos without any change or confusion. Cyril saw in Nestorius' teaching the 
theory of two sons: a mere external association with the Word and eternal man. If this is the 
case, then Christ's actions were not of God. Therefore, redemption is not effected. The 
redemption of the human race needs an intimate union, a hypostatic union. Also, if Nestorius' 
theory was right, then the Eucharist would be cannibalism: we would be consuming the body of 
a man rather than the body of God. Cyril described the union as hypostatic: the hypostasis of 
the Word (possessing divine nature) was truly united to a human nature. The Lord's humanity 
became a nature when it was united to the hypostasis of the Word. The humanity of the 
Incarnation never existed apart from the Word. The union of the two natures occurs without 
confusion or mixture: each remains distinct and retains its own properties. Cyril applied the 
attribution of properties to its proper sense: the Word of God suffered in the flesh, but the 
Word did not suffer in his divine nature.  
The debate over the title of Mary is a Christological debate. Christ is one subject only 
(hypostasis) and one person only (prosopon); He who is also man, through a union of divine and 
human nature. Therefore, Mary is truly Mother of God, because she gave birth according to the 
flesh to the ‘Word of God made flesh’; Christ is the Son of God and it is an error to say that 
Jesus the man is a divinized man and an adopted son of God; Christ’s flesh is life-giving, because 
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it is the flesh of the Word; Christ should be worshipped with one adoration, and not 
worshipped as God and separately worshipped as man; to the Person of the Word should be 
attributed not only the divine action but also the human action and passions of Jesus.29 
Nestorius asked Emperor Theodotus II to convoke the council in Ephesus (431), thinking the 
results would be his vindication. Cyril arrived first and held a session without Nestorius and his 
supporters. This council condemned Nestorius as ‘the new Judas’. When Nestorius' supporters 
arrived, they condemned Cyril. Papal delegates were sent to determine which council decision 
was correct, and they upheld Cyril. The Council defined the hypostatic union of two natures, 
divine and human, in the one divine person of Jesus Christ. The Council of Ephesus’ "Formula of 
Union" is as follows:  
We acknowledge that our Lord Jesus Christ...Son of God, perfect God and perfect 
man...born of Mary the virgin according to his humanity, one and the same, 
consubstantial with the Father in Godhead and consubstantial with us in 
humanity, for a union of two natures took place...Mary is the mother of God 
because God the Word took flesh and became man and from his very conception 
united to himself the temple he took from her.30  
 
The concern of the Council Fathers at Ephesus was exactly the same as had already been 
decisive in Nicaea, and which was in fact the fundamental contention of Scripture and of all 
tradition: It is God himself who meets us in Jesus Christ.31 The only new addition in the Ephesus 
decision was from the basic Nicene Christological idea, which predicated  the identity of one 
                                                        
29 Saint Cyril of Alexandria, Second letter to Nestorius (AD 430), which was read and approved 
by the Council Ephesus (431). (Cf, Ocáriz, Seco, and Riestra, The Mystery of Jesus Christ, p. 93). 
30 Heinrich Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et 
Morum Latin- English edited by Peter Hunermann, 43rd edition, (Ignatius Press San Francisco, 
2012); 271-273: Formula of the Union between Cyril of Alexandria and the Bishop of the Church 
of Antioch, Spring 433.  
31 Kasper, Jesus the Christ, p. 224. 
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subject of Jesus Christ, who from eternity is with the Father and who in time has become man, 
having both a divine and human nature. As a result, we can and must say that Mary is the 
Mother of God.32 The results of Ephesus are as follows: Cyril's anathemas were set aside 
because they were provocative and contained  confusing language regarding the one nature 
(since he was focusing on one person). There are also clarifications that the only person in Jesus 
is the eternal Word and that the natures were not united by conjunction. It also emphasizes the 
duality of the natures.  
What kind of union does Nestorianism posit, then, if it refuses a union in the nature of 
Christ and a union that is hypostatic? For Thomas Aquinas, his knowledge and use of conciliar 
and patristic sources has received much well-deserved scholarly attention. Question 2 of the 
Tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae often serves as a focal point of this attention due to its 
reliance on the texts previously unused in scholastic Christology. These texts include the acts of 
Ephesus, Chalcedon, and Constantinople II as well as supporting documents such as Pope Leo’s 
Tomus ad Flavianum and Cyril of Alexandria’s third letter to Nestorius and its anathemas.33 In 
question 2 of article 6 of the Tertia pars of the Summa Theologiae on whether human nature 
was united to the Word accidentally, Aquinas notes quite rightly that: 
The heresy of Nestorius  and Theodore of Mopsuestia separated the persons. For 
they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person of the 
Son of man and said these were mutually united: first, "by indwelling," inasmuch 
as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, "by unity 
of intention" inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement with the 
will of the Word of God;  thirdly, "by operation," inasmuch as they said the man 
was the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, "by greatness of honor," 
                                                        
32 Ibid., p. 224. 
33Corey L. Barnes, Thomas Aquinas’s Chalcedonian Christology and its Influence on Later 
Scholastics, the Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, Volume 78, Number 2, (April 2014), p. 
189-217, p. 198. 
 13 
inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the son of 
man, on account of His union with the Son of God; fifthly, "by equivocation," i.e. 
communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the Son 
of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union.34 
 
All of these trace back in some way to the moral unity of wills: Christ as man thinks and 
acts in coordination with the wisdom and will of the Word of God. The union is accidental to 
each hypostasis or subject because it characterizes or qualifies that subject but is distinct from 
the subject itself.35 Previously in this question, Aquinas had argued for the equivalence of 
person, hypostasis, and suppositum in the rational natures, with the result that assuming a 
hypostasis or suppositum amounts to assuming a person (STh III, q. 2. a.3).36  
In this  basic argument, Aquinas reasons that the first opinion inevitably affirms two 
persons in Christ, protests to the contrary notwithstanding.37 The first opinion necessarily 
lapses into the heresy of Nestorius because it divides the person in Christ under one name or 
another and because the union of these divided persons can be nothing other than accidental.38 
Aquinas shows, then, the true position which lies between the extremes. With the first position 
and against the second, Christ is one subject and person and so one must affirm in Christ a 
substantial union of God and man. The Word incarnate is one entity. With the second position 
and against the first, however, Christ is truly God and truly man. Thus, two natures remains 
distinct, without mixture or confusion, and the union must not occur in the nature of Christ but 
in the substance of Christ. It is a union in the person. 
                                                        
34 Summa theologiae, STh III, q. 2, a. 6.  
35 Ibid., p. 82. 
36 Barnes, “Thomas Aquinas’s Chalcedonian Christology and its Influence on Later Scholastics,” 
p. 200. 
37 Ibid., p. 200. 
38 Ibid., p. 200. 
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 In the Word made flesh there is one concrete, individual person and hypostasis 
subsisting in two natures.39 What we see, then, is that Aquinas is beginning to refine his 
concept of Nestorianism in the analysis of these later positions so as to apply it even to theories 
that seek explicitly to uphold a unity of person in Christ.40 The problem with such theories is 
that they share a common theme with classical Nestorian ideas. This is the theme of merely an 
accidental union of two subsistences or substances by means of a share quality or set of 
habitual relations. The union is not in the individual subsistent person of the Word strictly 
speaking, or otherwise said, the union is not hypostatic.41 But Jesus Christ is a kind of homo 
assumptus who is brought into accidental unity with the person of the Word.42 Therefore, “if 
the union have been accidental, the Word would not have become man. It is important to 
remember also that to equiparate the hypostatic union to the union with God which results 
from his indwelling through grace, would be to deny the truth of the Incarnation.”43  
The reason why the human nature of Jesus Christ cannot be accidentally united to the 
Word is because the union which a suppositum has with its own nature is never accidental, for 
if it were accidental it would not subsist in it.44 The fact that Christ pre-exists from all eternity 
does not apply that the human nature was united accidentally to him afterwards, for He 
assumed it in such a way that he is truly man. To be a man is substantial mode of being. Since 
the hypostasis of the Word is man in virtue of the human nature, the later did not come to Him 
                                                        
39 White, The Incarnation of the Lord, A Thomistic Study in Christology, p. 82. 
40 Ibid., p. 86. 
41 Ibid., p. 86. 
42 Ibid.,  p. 109. 
43 Ocáriz, Seo, and Riestra, The Mystery of Jesus Christ, p. 116. 
44 Ibid., p.117. 
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accidentally because accidents do not confer a substantial formal act.45 In conclusion, the union 
occurred in the Person, leaving the natures not confused but united, precisely because they 
belong to the same person. 
Monophysitism and the Council of Chalcedon (451)  
Monophysitism was the heresy of one nature. This heresy objected to the idea that 
there could be two natures in Christ because they thought it would lead to two subjects in 
Christ. Monophysitism denied that Christ’s human nature remained a human nature once it had 
been united to the Word. It held, then, that Christ is one Person with one nature.46 This position 
was originally promoted by Eutyches in Constantinople. He was the equivalent of a head abbot. 
He emphasized that Christ had two natures before the union, but after the union with flesh, 
Christ had one nature, which was the nature of the God made flesh become man. After the 
union, Christ's two natures were fused into a third entity: the human nature was swallowed up 
by the divinity. In this understanding, he rejected the suggestion of two natures as unscriptural 
and contrary to the teaching of the Fathers. Christ's flesh was not the same as ours; he was not 
consubstantial with us. He feared that admitting two natures would result in two subjects. He 
said the human nature was transformed into the substance of the divinity. The problem with 
this is that there was no human nature before the union, so there is a chronological error in his 
position.47  
                                                        
45 Ibid., p.117. 
46 Ralph J. Tapia, The Theology of Christ: Commentary Reading in Christology, (New York: Bruce, 
1971), p. 161. 
47 Ibid., p. 161. 
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The Monophysite thesis of Eutyches was condemned by Flavian, patriarch of 
Constantinople, who deposed Eutyches in 448. Pope Saint Leo the Great, who in his letter 
known as the Tome of Saint Leo, agreed to condemn the one nature theory, approve Flavian’s 
actions, and send him a Dogmatic Letter. In his letter, the Pope reaffirmed the true doctrine 
concerning the hypostatic union, teaching that in Christ there is only one Person and two 
natures, while remaining distinct and not confused.48 There were four main points in Leo's 
Tome which summarized the theology of the west: (1) The person of the God-man is identical 
with the person of the Logos. (2) The divine and human natures co-exist in this one person 
without mixture or confusion. (Each nature retains its own natural properties unimpaired). The 
redemption required that the same mediator should be able to both die in respect to one 
nature (human) and not die with respect to the other nature (divine). (3) The two natures are 
separate principles of operation, but they always act in harmony with each other. (4) The 
oneness of the person in Christ justifies the communication of properties. It's correct to say that 
the Son of God died in his human nature.49 
 At last, in 451, a genuine ecumenical council was held at Chalcedon, which solemnly 
defined the hypostatic union.50 The Council confirmed that there is one person in two natures 
in Christ. The Council clarified the terms with precision: two natures (substance/nature/ousia), 
one person (hypostasis/prosopon) and emphasized the preposition "in" two natures and not 
"from" two natures. This rejects the Eutychian notion of a mixture of the natures. Christ is in 
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two natures or of two natures but not from two natures. The significance of Chalcedon is: First, 
the Ecumenical Council included both the east and west. It reached a synthesis of the two 
eastern schools: Alexandria and Antioch. Second, it clarified the terms with precision: two 
natures (fusus/substance/nature/ousia), one person (hypostasis/ prosopon). Third, it 
emphasized the preposition "in" two natures and not "from" two natures. This rejects the 
Eutyucean notion of a mixture of the natures. Eutyches taught that Christ was one person that 
came from two natures. This also emphasizes that Christ is in two natures or of two natures but 
not from two. To say "from" implies that he no longer had them, that before he had two and 
after there was one. But this is illogical because he never had two natures before the union. 
This is considered a triumph of western theology and Antioch (which stressed two natures). 
Aquinas does not  agree with the view of Monophysitism. For him, if it is so, then the 
divinity and humanity in Christ is only accidental.51 In addition to that, Aquinas comes to 
concludes that Chalcedon was right to speak of divinity and humanity coming together in one 
person but not in one nature. For Aquinas, the humanity and divinity come together in Christ in 
one person, that is so say that one subject can be truly spoken of as we speak of a human, and 
that the same subject can be truly spoken of as we speak of God. A human being has a body 
since human nature includes a true body. So, as one can say that Christ has a body, one can also 
say of God that he is omniscient and omnipotent. So we can also say of Christ that he is also the 
same.52 Christ Jesus is one subject, existing in two natures, divine and human. 
Monothelitism and the Council of Constantinople III (680-681)  
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Monothelitism (monothelism) was the theory that Christ had only one will. Many 
monophysites refused to accept the teaching of the Council of Chalcedon: Sergius was patriarch 
of Constantinople who thought he could end the controversy between the orthodox and 
monophysites by proposing that Christ had only one will. Monothelitism held that the human 
nature was the instrument of the divinity and an instrument is not moved by its own will, but by 
the will of its user. Therefore, Christ did not have a human will because his humanity was used 
as an instrument of his divinity.53 Saint Sophrinus (Jerusalem) and Saint Maximus the Confessor 
opposed Monothelitism and taught that Christ had to has two wills and two intellects which 
were not opposed to each other. The human will follows the divine will, but actively. If Christ 
had a human nature without a human will, then he was not truly man and was certainly not 
perfect man.  
The Council of Constantinople III (680-681) was confirmed by Pope Agatho, who 
condemned Monothelitism and solemnly defined that:  
We declare that in him are two natural volitions or wills and two natural actions 
without division, without changes, without separation, without confusion… And 
the two natural wills are not contrary the one to the other, but his human will 
follows and that not as resisting and reluctant, but rather as subject to his divine 
and omnipotent will...The natural will of his flesh is called and is the proper will 
of God the Word...His human will was not suppressed, but was rather 
preserved.54  
 
Therefore, “preserving entirely what is neither fused nor divided, we proclaim the entire matter 
in this concise utterance: Believing that one of the Holy Trinity, who after the Incarnation is our 
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Lord Jesus Christ, is our true God, we say that his two natures shine forth in his one hypostasis. 
And the difference of natures in that same and unique hypostasis is recognized by the fact that 
each of the two natures and wills perform what is proper to it in communion with the other. 
Thus, we glory in proclaiming two natural wills and actions concurring together for the salvation 
of the human race.”55 
Thomas’s knowledge of earlier engagements with the topic of Christ’s two wills clarifies 
the specific shape of his own teaching. His historical research uncovered patristic debates on 
this subject, most notably the acts of Constantinople III.56 Among the acts of Constantinople III, 
Thomas found quotations from Augustine’s Contra Maximinum episcopum Arianorum, 
Ambrose’s De fide and super Lucam, Pseudo- Athanasius’s De incarnatione et Contra Arianos, 
and Leo’s Tomus ad Flavianum. Thomas’s knowledge and use of these sources (in ST.III, q. 9, 13, 
18 and 19) comes from Pope Agatho’s Epistle I, Ad Augustos Imperatores.57 Recovery of these 
sources produced results for Thomas’s teaching parallel to his recovery of the acts of the 
councils of Ephesus, Chalcedon, and Constantinople II. In his affirmations of these sources, 
Thomas Aquinas affirms the two wills of Jesus Christ. Summa theologiae III, q. 18, a. 1 begins 
the discussion of Christ’s wills by establishing the presence of two wills in Christ.58 Corey L. 
Barnes concurs in the Summa,  
Thomas argues first in response to Apollinaris, who did not hold an intellectual 
soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place of the soul, or even in 
place of the intellect. From this follows that in Christ there was no human will; 
and thus there was only one will in Him. Second,  Eutyches and all who held one 
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composite nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him. Third, he refers 
to Nestorius who maintained that the union of God and man was one of 
affection and will, and held only one will in Christ. Finally, he dismisses the ideas 
of Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of 
Constantinople and some of their followers, who held that there is one will in 
Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a 
hypostasis.59  
 
These heresies, according to Thomas, are fundamental errors because they think that the 
human nature in Christ was never moved by its own, proper motion, but only according as it 
was moved by the divinity.60 The heresies of Apollinarius and Nestorius, though different, 
misconceive the hypostatic union in ways that compromise Christ’s possession of both the 
divine will and a human will.61  
By establishing the presence of two wills in Christ, Aquinas affirms that the act of 
Constantinople III did more than merely confirm the accepted position; it introduced a 
misunderstanding of Christ’s will that was not reducible to other Christological heresies.62 He 
said,  
And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople, it was decreed that it 
must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the following passage: "In 
accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, and as He 
taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, 
we confess two natural wills in Him and two natural operations. 63 
 
It is certain that for Aquinas, “through the assumption of human nature the son of God 
underwent no diminution in those things which pertain to divine nature. As the divine nature 
includes a will, it is necessary to say that in Christ there are two wills, namely one divine and the 
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other human.”64  Aquinas holds that the Word assumed an integral human nature and 
therefore possessed a human will in addition to the divine will.  
The themes of treating two wills in Christ was expressed in St III, q. 18, a. 1 to provide 
keys for Aquinas’s replies to the objections in each work. The objections and replies offer clues 
to the development of Thomas thought on this issue.65 The first objection that he raises is: “It 
would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one Divine, the other human. For the will is 
the first mover and first commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and 
commander was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the Divine 
will.”66 Aquinas replies that, 
Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at the bidding of the 
Divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the 
will proper to human nature, for the good wills of other saints are moved 
by God’s will, "Who worketh" in them "both to will and to accomplish.67  
 
Aquinas’ claim that “for although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, 
yet it can be moved inwardly by God.”68 Through these points, he comes to conclude that 
“Christ by His human will followed the Divine will.”69 The second objection argues for the 
absence of a human will due to the human will’s role as an instrument.70 It is part of Aquinas’s 
discussion about Christ’s human will as an instrument which is not moved by its own will but by 
the will of its mover. So if the human nature of Christ was the instrument of His Godhead, then 
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the human nature of Christ was not moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.71 Aquinas 
responds to this objection by saying that “It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the 
principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its nature. And hence it was in this 
manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved 
by its own will.”72 The third objection, part of Aquinas’s argument as a misconception of a 
correct principle, is that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs to the nature. This should 
not, the objection maintains, include a will, because natural things are from necessity, while the 
will involves what is not necessary.73 Aquinas responds by saying that “the power of the will is 
natural, and necessarily follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power—
which is also called will—is sometimes natural and necessary.”74 Hence, in addition to the 
Divine will, it is necessary to place in Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power or 
a natural movement, but even as a rational movement.75  
In summary, following Thomas’s treatment, the human will of Christ is used as 
instrument for the divine will, but it's an active instrument. He used his human will to merit our 
salvation. In Christ, the human will was entirely subject to the divine will through because the 
human will being should be ruled by reason. This is how we become saints when our human will 
is completely ruled by the divine will. Following Thomas’s design, logically and effectively 
buildings upon itself, referring back to its treatment of the hypostatic union in Summa 
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theologiae III, q. 2. The necessary premises are already well established, and so affirmation of 
Christ’s two wills requires only a pro forma argument, as it flows directly from a proper 
understanding of the hypostatic union.76  
Chapter two 
The Hypostatic Union in Jesus Christ’s Mode of Union: Union, Nature Assumed, 
Person Assuming.  
 
Christ Jesus is God and he is Man; he is one subject, one person, existing in two natures, 
divine and human. He who is God is Man. The oneness in Jesus has always been a 
presupposition in the Church’s faith regarding the humanity and divinity of Jesus Christ. The 
essence of the mystery of the Incarnation is the hypostatic union, which the Council of 
Chalcedon defined as the union of the two real natures, human and divine, in the one person of 
the Logos, of the Father: 
Following the holy Fathers, all with one consent, teach men to confess one and 
the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead and also 
perfect in manhood; truly God and truly man, of a rational soul and body; 
consubstantial with the Father according to the Godhead, and consubstantial 
with us according to the Manhood;… born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of 
God, according to the Manhood; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, only 
begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, 
indivisibly, inseparably; the distinction of nature’s being by no means taken away 
by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and 
concurring in one Person and one Subsistence, not parted or divided into two 
persons, but one and the same Son, and only begotten, God the Word, the Lord 
Jesus Christ.77 
 
                                                        
76 Barnes, “Christ’s Two Wills in Scholastic Though,” p. 123. 
77 Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Morum 
Latin- English edited by Peter Hunermann, 43rd edition, Council of Chalcedon’s Creed (451) 
Definition of Faith (DS 300). 
 24 
With the Council of Chalcedon, the distinction between person and nature became 
firmly established; also, the hypostatic union was recognized as something real, that is, 
belonging to the objective order of being.78 The Chalcedonian dogma solemnly confirms that 
Christ is the Son of God, true God who truly became man. One and the same Christ, our Lord 
and Savior, is indeed God and Man. The religious significance of this doctrine is immense, 
inasmuch as the entirety of our faith in salvation rests on the conviction that Christ is both God 
and Man. Salvation is likewise impossible if Christ is only God or only Man.79 Clearly, the close 
union that exists in Christ should not be sought in the idea of nature; it must come from 
something different, since the two natures remain unchanged after union.80  
St. Thomas’s theology of the union of Christ’s two natures is the central building block of 
his Christology, a theological achievement of paramount importance.81 St. Thomas’s approach 
to Christology presupposes that the Chalcedonian teaching is correct. The Council of Chalcedon 
insisted on both the unity of Christ’s person and the integrity of his two natures, so it is 
extremely helpful to understand Thomas’s theory of the hypostatic union. Saint Thomas 
Aquinas’s treatment of the doctrine of the Incarnation is metaphysical, and as such one can talk 
about the metaphysics of the Incarnation. The Incarnation is explained by Aquinas through the 
concept of union in one supposit, maintaining that the Incarnation took place in one supposit or 
hypostasis. Aquinas’s of the word ‘hypostasis’ is metaphysical, but for clarity sake, he goes on 
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to explain what the term hypostasis or supposit means and how the Incarnation took place in 
one hypostasis: 
Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, particular not in just any fashion, but 
as rounded off and complete. A substantial reality, e.g. a hand or a foot that 
enters into union with something more complete is not called hypostasis. 
Similarly, the human nature of Christ is not called a hypostasis or supposit. It is, 
to be sure, a particular substance, but it comes into something more complete, 
namely with whole Christ as God and man: that complete reality to which it is 
joined is called the hypostasis or supposit.82 
 
In a further explanation of the mystery of the Incarnation and also the manner in which the 
Incarnation took place, Aquinas taught that the Incarnation can only be understood as existing 
in ‘a person’. So, in order to explain that the two natures of Christ are united in the person (in 
hypostasis), not the nature, Saint Thomas Aquinas logically analyzes how the Incarnation took 
place in one person (Christ), not in the nature. He states: 
Consequently, all that is present in any person, whether belonging to his nature 
nor not, is united to him in person. If, then, the human nature is not united to 
the Word (Logos) in person, it would not be united at all. To hold that would be 
to abolish belief in the Incarnation and to undermine the entire Christian faith. 
Since therefore, the Word has a human nature united to himself, (…) It follows 
that this union was effected in the person of the Word (…) And because human 
nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so the His 
nature receives there from any addition or change, it follows that the union of 
human nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in the 
nature.83 
It is clear why Saint Thomas wants to say that the hypostatic union is a union in person that is 
not a union in nature, but a difficulty arises from the fact that one of the united items is a 
human nature.  
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St Thomas does not raise the problem in these terms, but we can understand  how he 
would solve it.84 Aquinas asks whether the union of the incarnate Word took place in nature? 
To make this clear he states what is meant by nature,  
The word “nature” comes from nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to 
signify the begetting of living beings, which is called "birth". Afterwards this word 
“nature” was taken to signify the principle of this begetting; and because in living 
things the principle of generation is an intrinsic principle, this word "nature" was 
further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the 
Philosopher says that nature is the principle of motion in that in which it is 
essentially and not accidentally. Now this principle is either form or matter. 
Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter. Because of the 
end of natural generation in that which is generated, is the essence of the 
species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species is called the 
“nature”.85 
 
With Aquinas, for the purpose of this analysis, all that matters is that (a) the things that enter 
into the union are complete in themselves, i.e., something could exist having this nature alone, 
and (b) the process of being united causes the united things to be transformed. If this is what is 
meant by “union in nature,” says Aquinas, then the hypostatic union cannot be a union in 
nature.86 By regarding types of union in nature, Richard Cross says, Aquinas considers three 
types of them:  
(1) some artificial nature which is constituted by layout of parts, where each part 
retains its own nature and numerical identity, this type of union, for Aquinas, is 
only accidental: and Church doctrine excludes an accidental union in Christ. 
Moreover, this type of union does not result in a genuine unity at all. The 
resulting form is artificial, not natural: and thus it could not count as one nature 
in any case; (2) a mixture of two or more elements resulting in some third type 
of substance. For Aquinas, this type of union is impossible since divine nature is 
totally immutable, and thus could not mix with a human nature to produce some 
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composite type of thing; (3) a union of two incomplete things which together 
constitute a whole of some particular type.87   
 
The overall purpose of Aquinas’ discussion of union in nature is twofold. Negatively, it opposes 
Monophysite theories, i.e., theories that say that there is only one nature in Christ. Positively, it 
affirms that the two natures, humanity and divinity, are really there, untransformed and in their 
full perfections.88 With the purpose of the first distinction between “nature” and “suppositum” 
(hypostasis, person) which Aquinas proposes is to show that Christ’s human nature must be 
united to his divine nature in his suppositum.89  
One of the ways Aquinas  speaks of  Christ  being one person with two natures is by 
deploying the idea of “union in person.”90 He asks whether the union of the Word incarnate 
took place in the suppositum or hypostasis? It is clear why Thomas wants to say that the 
hypostatic union is a union in person that is not a union in nature.91 Aquinas uses the hypostasis 
and person interchangeably. They signify what Aquinas has in mind when he uses the word 
suppositum in the sense of ‘subject’ or ‘individual’. The difference between them is that 
‘person’, for Aquinas, adds to hypostasis the notion of being rational.92 By knowing that the 
words he uses are not the same as knowing the thoughts he has.93  
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Considering the concept of the ‘person’ with the question of what Aquinas means when 
he says that Christ is one person, what does he mean when he says that Christ has both a divine 
and a human nature? To answer these questions about his Christology, we must first have an 
understanding of what he means by ‘person.’ Aquinas in fact, often uses Boethius’ famous 
definition of person as an “individual substance of a rational nature.” At this point, Aquinas says 
that: “person adds a determinate nature to ‘hypostasis.’ For it is nothing other than a 
hypostasis of a rational nature.94 St Thomas’ definition of a divine person (I, q. 29) is the great 
breakthrough of his Trinitarian theology. He defines a Divine Person as a relation as subsisting. 
The word “person” is here used in an analogous way, and it is an individual substance of a 
rational nature. Saint Thomas Aquinas modified the Aristotelian category of relation and 
Boethius’s definition of person in order to come to this new definition: ‘person’ as “a complete 
substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else.95 Human nature in Christ, for Aquinas, 
means that Christ had a real body of the same nature as ours and a true rational soul. He taught 
that Christ came through the Virgin’s womb in such a way that He really took flesh from the 
Virgin Mary; that Christ felt hunger, He ate, suffered and had other experiences common to the 
nature of human flesh. To make this teaching clear, he considers how the union of the 
incarnate Word is of the person, not of nature. Still, because he distinguishes between a 
possessive subject and an effective one, he can sort out the different functions of both nature 
and person in the mystery of the Incarnation. As a personal unity, Christ enjoys only one 
effective subject, the eternal Logos. But besides the effective principle of unity which Christ 
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receives through his uncreated personhood, he also enjoys two possessive subjects, since each 
nature does what remains proper to it.96 Three points in this text require further commentary,  
First, since the person of the Word pre-exists, Christ’s created human nature 
does not constitute his person but rather joins it. Second, this same infinite 
person also possesses the divine nature, ‘one in being with the Father.’ Third, the 
human nature, one hypostatically united to the person of the Word, remains an 
individual nature, enjoying all of the operations proper to human nature, though 
not in itself personalized in the same way, since the second person of the 
blessed Trinity alone assumed our human nature.97  
 
We see this clearly in Aquinas’s Trinitarian doctrine when he tries to distinguish the persons in 
the Holy Trinity.  
Aquinas emphasizes the most important view that the Person signifies relationship as 
subsisting. “Person” when used of God signifies nature and relation at the same time, either by 
signifying the nature directly and relation by implication, or by signifying relation directly and 
nature by implication, since when person is defined, nature is mentioned by implication. 
Aquinas thinks that this comes closest to the truth of the matter. He affirms that “person” in 
God, a divine person, means relation as something subsisting. Distinction in God arises only 
through the relation of origin; but relation in God is not something accidental, but it is the 
divine nature itself; it is something subsisting just as the divine nature does. Hence, divine 
person signifies relation as something subsisting as substance which is a hypostasis subsisting in 
the divine nature, though what is subsisting is nothing other than the divine nature. In this 
sense, “person” signifies relation directly and nature by implication; yet relation is signified, not 
as relation, but as hypostasis. Likewise, “person” signifies nature directly and relation indirectly 
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inasmuch as nature is identical with hypostasis; the word “hypostasis” in God means what is 
distinct by reason of a relation.98 Aquinas says that in God, there are no accidents, only 
Existence itself. So, relation is not an accident in God, rather it is identical to the divine 
substance itself. If this is the case, relations subsists in virtue of the divine essence to which it is 
identical, and it distinguishes the person in virtue of the relationship toward the other, which 
constitutes the ratio. Romanus Cessario, O.P. says, “indeed, Aquinas finds in the trinitarian 
theology a source for establishing the person of the Word as the one who most fittingly 
becomes the Incarnation.”99  
Aquinas uses the notion of union in person in order to assert that humanity and divinity 
in Christ are united in person and excludes Nestorian - style theories, i.e., theories according to 
which Christ is more than one person. Also, by using the notion of union in person to hold that 
the Word is one person while Jesus is another is to deny that two natures are united in one 
person.100 We come to conclude something of importance that Aquinas assigns to this article of 
faith in his concluding remarks in q. 2, a. 2: 
Consequently, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person, whether it 
belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is not united to God the 
Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is 
altogether done away with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, 
inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong 
to His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the 
Word, and not in the nature 101 
 
                                                        
98 Summa Theologiae, STh Ia, q. 29, a. 4. 
99 Cessario, “The Godly Image- Christ and Salvation in Catholic Thought from Anselm to 
Aquinas,” p. 135.  
100 Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, p.46. 
101 Summa Theologise, STh III, q. 2, a. 2. 
 31 
In Christ we have one human subject who is also a divine subject. Divinity and humanity 
are united in one being. On this basis, Aquinas affirms that what began to be with the 
Incarnation is the union of what is united in one subject. That occurred when the changeless 
Son of God took on himself a changeable human nature conceived by the virgin Mary.102 The 
Incarnation happened; he became something that he was not before. God does not change as a 
result of becoming man, but rather the assumed human nature changed. There is an objection 
to Aquinas’s way of proceeding that should be considered, an objection that he raises himself in 
ST III, q. 2, a. 2. It is part of Aquinas’ understanding of God that for any divine person, person 
and nature are identical.103 Now the Person of God is not distinct from His nature. If, therefore, 
the union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the person.104 
Aquinas responds by saying that although in God, Nature and Person are not really distinct, 
they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after the manner 
of something subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word 
subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives there from any addition or change, it follows 
that the union of  human nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in 
the nature.105 This means that the Incarnation was not a question of one nature replacing the 
other. The mystery of the Incarnation did not involve any sort of change in the state of God’s 
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eternal existence. Instead it took place by His uniting Himself in a new fashion, a creature, or, 
more precisely, by a creature becoming united to Him.106  
In giving an account of the Incarnation, Thomas Aquinas states that Christ is a composite 
person:  
 
The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in 
itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, 
in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; 
and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one 
subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence 
He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two.107 
 
So Christ is, for Aquinas, the hypostatic union results in composite person. Aquinas further 
develops his theory and in a way that makes it more adequate. That Aquinas holds Christ to be 
composite is worth noting not only for its own sake, however, but also because it is a crucial 
element of another way in which Thomas goes beyond the basic theory.108 First, we look at  
Thomas’ treatment  in the Summa theologiae’s of Prima pars, in STh. Ia, q. 3: is there any way in 
which God is composite, or is he altogether simple, and STh. Ia, q. 9: “The Immutability” shows 
that there are many ways of showing that God is altogether simple. First, God is not composed 
of extended parts, since he is not a body. (Ia. 3, 1); nor of form and matter (Ia. 3, 2); nor does he 
differ from his own nature (Ia. 3, 3); nor is his essence from his existence (Ia. 3, 4); nor can he 
be distinguished by genus and difference (i.e., God falls into no class of entities) (Ia. 3, 5); nor by 
substance and accidents (Ia. 3, 6). Second, every composite is subsequent to and dependent on 
its components, while God is the first of all beings (la. 2, 3). Again, composition requires a cause 
to join the components, while God is not caused but the first cause (Ia. 2, 3). Furthermore, 
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composition implies the actualization of potentialities either in the components or insofar as 
they constitute a new whole, which cannot occur in God (Ia. 3, 7). Finally, from the relationship 
of parts to wholes: Nothing composite can be predicated of its own component parts which is 
true both of heterogeneous composites (a whole of dissimilar parts: can’t predicate “man” of 
“foot”) and of homogeneous composites (a whole of similar parts: sometimes yes, sometimes 
no). 
 In all composites there is some element not sharing a common predicate with the 
whole. In a form (“whiteness”) there is nothing other than itself; but in something that has a 
form (“a white dish”) other elements are present (shape, clay, gloss, etc.). Now God is form 
itself, indeed existence itself, and can in no way be composite (Ia. 3, 7). While it is true that 
things deriving from God resemble him as effects resemble the primary cause, their composite 
character does not mirror him, for it is in the nature of an effect to be composite in some way 
since even at its simplest level it is not its own existence (Ia. 3, 7). With the question (la.3, 8): 
does God enter into composition with other things? Aquinas holds three errors have been 
made concerning this matter: (1) God as world-soul or soul of the highest heaven. (2) God as 
formal principle of things. (3) God as prime matter. So, he gives three arguments against the 
view that God enters into composition with things: (1) Since God is the first cause of all things 
(Ia. 2, 3), he cannot be identified with his effects. An efficient cause can be specifically identical 
with its effect but not numerically identical with it (e.g., a man begets another man). An 
efficient cause can be neither specifically nor numerically identical with prime matter: the 
efficient cause is actual; matter is potential. (2) Since God is a cause, he is a primary and 
immediate source of activity. A composite rather than its components is the primary and 
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immediate source of activity (e.g. a hand does not act, but a man acts by means of it). (3) God is 
the primary being, without qualification. No component can be absolutely primary (not matter, 
since as potency it is absolutely subsequent to actuality; nor form which is only partial with 
respect to what is essentially that form). Hence God enters into composition with nothing 
else.109  
In the immutability of God, which Aquinas treats in  ST. I, q. 9, he holds first that the 
argument up to this point shows God to be altogether unchangeable. It has been shown that 
there must be some first existence called God, purely actual and without any potentiality. 
Actuality, simply speaking, precedes potentiality. Only something potential can change. Hence 
God cannot change in any way. Second, it has been shown that God is not composite, but 
altogether simple. But things in change are always composite, because anything in change 
partly persists and partly passes. Hence as non-composite God cannot change. Third,  it has 
been shown at various points that God, being limitless and embracing within himself the whole 
fullness of perfection of all existence, cannot acquire anything, nor can he move out towards 
something previously not attained. But anything which changes acquires something through 
the change which he previously had not attained. Hence, God cannot change. (la. 9, 2): Only 
God is altogether unchangeable; creatures can all change in one way or another.110 
By definition, God is pure act, which is incapable of change. "And the Word became 
flesh" (John 1:14) seems to indicate that God changed when the Incarnation happened; he 
became something that he was not before. God does not change as a result of becoming man, 
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but the assumed human nature changed. The Word experienced no added perfection through 
the Incarnation. God does not need to be united to human nature in order to be perfected. The 
immutability and the simplicity of God, however, raises some problems for the Incarnation. 
First, the Incarnation seems to require that the Word be as it is in virtue of something else, that 
it has its being - as - human from its assumed humanity, but the impassibility seems to make 
this impossible111. Second, the Incarnation seems to require change from a non-incarnate and 
non-human state to an incarnate and human state, but immutability seems to make this 
impossible.112  
Aquinas handles these difficulties by showing the general relation between God and 
creation, and then how he understands the Incarnation.113 First, we look at the procession of  
the Godhead in his treatment of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity in the Summa theologiae in 
the First Pars. In the question of the procession in the Godhead, question 27, Aquinas suggests 
that:  
We must understand procession as an intellectual action that occurs within the 
Godhead. When we understand, by the very intellectual act of understanding, 
there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the object 
understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding 
from our knowledge of the object. This conception is signified by the spoken 
word; and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice. 
Procession in God, therefore, is not to be understood as in bodies (according to 
local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, 
for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot.) Rather it is to be 
understood by way of an intelligible emanation. 114 
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Thus, procession in God will not be like local motion or like the cause proceeding to an external 
effect, but like the immanent procession of the internal word in the activity of understanding. 
As Hans Schwarz reflects on Aquinas’ teaching on the Trinity, he says that “when Aquinas 
discusses the Trinity, he shows that Scripture talks about God as to signify procession, not in 
terms of bodily procession but of an intellectual one.”115 Hence, in this way it is possible to see 
how there can be procession in God. Aquinas states that “procession” expresses something 
inherent in God Himself in a manner similar to the intelligible word that proceeds from the 
speaker yet remains in him. This inward relation of procession means that what proceeds in 
God is God as well, is the same substance. This literally applies to God’s generation of his Word, 
or the Father’s begetting of the Son.116 In God, the Father ‘understands Himself’ by a single 
eternal act and so generates an eternal Word - as a conception proceeding from his act of 
understanding - that expresses the Father.117 Aquinas suggests two senses of the term 
“generation” to understand the procession of the Word within God:  
First, taken broadly, generation is common to all perishable things since it refers 
to the change from not existing to existing. Second, properly speaking, 
generation refers to living things and means that a living thing originates from a 
principle which is alive and conjoined to it – a process properly termed “birth”. 
The proper concept of generation will only apply where the thing generated 
possesses a likeness to the originator, such as that which  is  specifically of the 
same nature as that from which it is generated. Hence, the procession of the 
Word in God is called “generation” and the Word itself is called “Son.” 118  
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At the relation in the Godhead, Aquinas resorts to the concept of “relation” for the 
Trinity in order to place emphasis on the unity and oneness by means of identifying the 
substance and existence of the “persons” in the Trinity. Aquinas’ definition of relation is as 
follows: “Relation itself must be founded in the origin of the person, that is, in an action giving 
rise to a procession.” Real relations are founded in the activity between the agent and the end; 
they have a concrete existence in the divine nature.119 This inward procession and its identity 
with God’s being indicate what Thomas says, that relations exist really in God.120 When 
something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, both the one proceeding and the 
source of procession communicate in the same order, and they have real relations with each 
other. This we see in the procession of the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the 
Father and the Son, and so we say that these relations really exist in God.121 But relation in its 
own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another.122 Since the processions in God are 
within the same nature, the relations they entail are real and these relation’s reality lies in that 
they all proceed from and move toward the same principal substance.123 Moreover, the 
concept of relation enables us to speak of both the divine essence in its simplicity as well as the 
persons in their uniqueness.124 For Aquinas, everything which is not the divine essence is a 
creature. But relation really belongs to God.125  
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In order to grasp the point at issue here, Aquinas suggests that it is necessary to 
consider the matter from the point of view of the created and uncreated orders: in created 
things relations can be considered as accompaniments, as it were, signifying references 
superimposed. Still, considered in the category of accident, a relation is inherent in the subject 
in which it has accidental existence. On the other hand, in the uncreated order, whatever has 
an accidental existence in creatures has substantial existence when applied to God, for nothing 
in God is an accident since whatever is in God is his nature. While relation in created things 
exists as an accident in a subject, in God a real existing relation has the existence of the divine 
nature and is completely identical with it. When we think of a relation as a ‘being to something’ 
we indicate a bearing not on the nature but on an opposite term. Hence, a real relation in God 
is identical with his nature and differs only in our mind’s understanding inasmuch as relation 
implies a reference to a correlative term which is not implied by the term “nature”. 
 In God, relation and nature are existentially not two things but one and the same.126 For 
Aquinas, all relations between the creature and God are real in the creature, but for God they 
represent only a relation in reason. Thus the human nature of Jesus has real relationship of 
belonging with respect to the Word, whereas in the Word there is a relationship of reason 
towards his humanity.127 But how does it work in the case of the Incarnation? Thomas holds 
that the hypostatic union is a mixed relation and that the real relation establishing the union 
resides in the assumed humanity (a creature).128 The union of humanity and divinity in Christ 
does not require Christ’s divinity to bear a relation to the humanity, and divine impassibility is 
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thus preserved. Since all the metaphysical equipment of the relation is on the side of the 
human nature, the divine Word in itself is not metaphysically affected by the fact of the 
Incarnation.129 
 In the hypostatic union, the human nature receives, from the relation, the property of 
being related to the Word, while the Word itself receives nothing from anything; the first of 
these facts is sufficient for there being a union between them, and the second is sufficient for 
this union’s not violating divine impassibility.130 When the Incarnation takes place, change 
occurs on the side of the assumed nature, not on the side of the Word. There truly is, then, a 
change in relation between the Word and its humanity, but this is in such a way that the Word’s 
immutability is not compromised. In the Incarnation, the real relation of the human nature to 
the Word is such as to constitute just one person, while the real relation of the creature to God 
in the normal case is not such as to constitute just one person.131 In his treatment of the 
Incarnation, Aquinas asks the question: whether the union between the Word and the assumed 
humanity is something created? He answers:  
the union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the 
Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of 
the Son of God. Every relation which we consider between God and the creature 
is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; 
whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not 
arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which 
we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in 
the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is 
something created.132 
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Aquinas’s idea is that the union, a relation accident, is a creature, because it exists not in the 
divine person but instead in humanity. When the union between the Word and humanity 
comes to be, all the mutating happens on the human side, and none of it on the divine side.133 
Aquinas insists that the Word, being the logical term of a mixed relation, does not 
change. Rather, Christ’s human nature has a real relation to act between the Word and 
humanity whereby the union between the two occurs.134 The Word, though “its own esse 
personale, which is its very act of being, relates humanity to itself. Still, in this act of relating, 
which is simply that of a logical term’s relating a real term of itself, the Word undergoes no 
change. One might say, perhaps, that the Word does change - not absolutely, but only 
relatively, that is, relative to Christ’s humanity, for now there is a new relation on the part of 
Christ’s humanity to the pre-existing esse personale of the Word. That is to say, it is Christ’s 
humanity that changes absolutely, in the same way in which an act of creation results in an 
absolute change of the creature from nonexistence to existence.”135 We can see this in an 
objection in ST.III, q. 16, a. 6 that Aquinas raises himself. This is the part in which Aquinas 
understands “God is man.” Now if to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the 
subject of change, according to Malachi 3:6: "I am the Lord, and I change not." Hence this 
is false: "God was made man." Aquinas responds by saying that “to be man belongs to God by 
reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated 
of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a 
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Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, "God was made man," we understand no change on 
the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature.”136 
Being, Person and Nature of Jesus Christ 
 Saint Thomas Aquinas’ treatment of the doctrine of the Incarnation is metaphysical, 
and as such one can talk about the metaphysics of the Incarnation. The Incarnation is explained 
by Aquinas through the concept of union in one supposit, maintaining that the Incarnation took 
place in one supposit or hypostasis. The Church has affirmed that in Jesus there is one single 
human nature but not a human person. This immediately gives rise to the question: How is it 
that Jesus had a complete human nature (true man) but was not a human person? Or why 
being a true man doesn’t require a human person?137 The question has long engaged 
theologians seeking a coherent explanation of the mystery of the Incarnation.138 Many different 
explanations have been put forward, with various philosophical and theological positions. In 
Scotus’ view, the “theological dogma of the mystery of the Incarnate Word requires the belief 
that Christ is both God and man, possessed of a singular divine and a singular human nature. It 
also entails the further belief that the personhood of Christ is divine only. He is not a human 
person because the singular human nature of Christ does not lack anything positive that would 
be required for it to be a person, for the human nature assumed by Christ was a singular, not a 
common one. Since it exists in communion with the Word, it lacks the status of 
incommunicability, and hence cannot be a person.”139 
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 The Church, however, should follow the basic points in the teaching of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas, because he is the author who is the most clearly in line with the ordinary notions of 
person and nature used by the Church to define dogmatic truth concerning the mystery of 
Christ.140 For Aquinas, every created thing is a metaphysical composition of essence (what it is) 
and existence (the act of being). Human nature requires body and soul, but it still needs an act 
of existence (esse) to exist. A person (hypostasis) is a complete substance subsisting of itself: an 
active subject. A person is a subsistence of a complete nature. Normally, every complete 
human nature is also a human person because it has a proportional act of being (esse) which 
makes it exist.  But in the case of the Incarnation, the human nature of Jesus is perfect, but it 
does not constitute a human person because it does not exist by virtue of a proper and 
proportionate act of being of its own, but by virtue of the divine being of the Word.141 The 
Word gives existence to the human nature of Jesus; that the human nature that Christ assumed 
did not have its own esse.142 The Divine nature gives the act of being (esse) to the human 
nature, so that human nature belongs to the divine person. The human nature did not have or 
need its own existence/subsistence because he was already the possessor of existence. The 
human nature of Christ does not need to be a human person because it doesn't have its own 
act of being. "The human nature of Christ is complete and perfect in itself and yet it is not a 
human person; because the subsistence which constitutes it as a person is really distinct from 
the nature. In Jesus, it is the Word who causes the human nature to subsist in Himself".143  
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For Aquinas, “the singular human nature of Christ falls short of meeting the 
requirements of human personhood because it lacks that reality quintessential to a human 
person, that is, an esse limited by the very nature it activates. What is lacking, therefore, 
pertains neither to the order of essence nor accident, but to the highest order within existing 
things, namely, esse, the actuality of actualities.”144 Also, for Aquinas, “the human nature of 
Christ lacks nothing at level of nature or accidental perfection, including individuation, that 
would prevent it from being a human person. Rather, what is lacking is its own human 
existential act, for the nature, though actual and singular, is not actualized by esse that is 
uniquely its own by reason of its being limited, and hence determined, by the nature it 
actualizes. Hence, Christ is not a human person, because the ultimate actualizing principle of 
His human nature is not unqualifiedly human but is, rather, unqualifiedly divine.”145 By 
assuming an individual human nature into hypostatic union, the person of the Word became a 
person of human nature. What there is not in Christ is a simply or purely human person, 
Thomas affirms that there is no person part in addition to the person of the Word. By virtue of 
the Word’s assumption of an individual human nature into hypostatic union, the esse of the 
person of the Word became the esse of a human being.146 
When speaking of the Person of Christ, we cannot avoid referring to Trinitarian 
theology.147 In the early Church, there were Christological heresies related to the errors in 
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Trinitarian theology. These errors included Monarchianism, a Christological heresy preceding 
Nicea which rejected the distinction of persons in the Trinity. It also claimed that the Son and 
Holy Spirit are only expressions of the one God. Another error was Subordinationism, which 
held that the Son and the Holy Spirit are subordinate in nature to God the Father. It is an effort 
to explain the divinity of Christ without offending Monothelitism. This is a Trinitarian error that 
results in a Christological error. It contradicts the faith of the Church and led to the heresy of 
Arianism. Arianism is a Trinitarian error that held that the Word is a creature, which results in a 
Christological error that Christ is not divine. This position holds that the Son was created out of 
nothing, outside of time. He was the first and most exalted of creatures. That the Father begot 
the Son implies that he was made. The Son is not self-existent, but owes his existence to the 
Father's will, not the Father's nature. The Son is not co-eternal with the Father. As a creature, 
he must have had a beginning. The Father created this Son outside of time, prior to creation. 
"There was a time when the Son was not". Also, the Son is not consubstantial with the Father 
(he doesn't have the same substance/being/nature with the Father). The Son is not a natural 
Son of God, but is God's adopted Son. If the Son is a creature, then he is imperfect and subject 
to change and even capable of sinning. The created Word took the place of the human soul in 
Christ. Hunger, thirst, suffering, and death are attributed to the Word because the Word is a 
creature. God foresaw that Christ would remain virtuous, so God bestowed on him the grace of 
impeccability (sinlessness). The Son is called God in name only, by participation in grace. These 
Christological heresies, preceding Nicea had been condemned by the Councils of the early 
Church. The divine Person of Jesus is identical with the divine nature and divine being, but he is 
really distinct from the person of the Father and the person of the Holy Spirit… In Christ the 
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Person is the subsistent relationship with the Father. Therefore, Jesus’ human nature, because 
it does not subsist in itself  but exists through and in the Being of the Son, has no relationship of 
its own with the Father, rather, the whole Christ (God and man) is the natural Son of the 
Father.148  
After considering Saint Thomas Aquinas’ concept of the hypostatic union, the errors and 
heresies concerning Christ’s divine and human nature and the teachings of the Fathers of the 
Church through various councils, we will now offer a summary of the hypostatic union: The two 
natures of Christ (human and divine) are united in the hypostasis (the person of the Word). The 
human nature gets its act of being from the divine hypostasis of the Word. It gets an 
immediate, direct infusion of uncreated act of being. This is why Christ's human nature is not a 
human person...it doesn't have its own independent existence...its own subsistence. The 
human nature doesn't have its own independent existence apart from the Word. There is no 
need for a human person nor any room for a human person because there's already a person 
that takes to Himself a human nature. This does not mean that the Divine Being enters into a 
composition of human nature. The two separate natures are united without confusion. The 
subsistence of the human nature is the subsistence of the Word. The subsistence is distinct 
from the human nature because it's a pre-existent subsistence. (This is why there is no change 
in God through the Incarnation). The union of the human and divine nature in Christ is an 
ontological union.  
Chapter three 
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The Purpose of the Incarnation and Its Eschatological Significance: Christ’s 
Restoration of Man’s Imago Dei Is the Fulfillment of Man’s Ultimate End. 
 
What is the human being? This question is posed to every generation and to each 
individual human being, for in contrast to the animal, our life is not simply laid out for us in 
advance. What it means for us to be a human being is for each one of us a task and an appeal to 
our freedom.149 The question about human being requires a fresh search into our human- 
beingness. We then decide who or what we want to be as humans. The bible account of 
creation means give some orientation in the mysterious region of human- beingness. It is meant 
to help us appreciate the human person as God’s project and to help us formulate the new and 
creative response to all that God expects from each one of us. To answer the question of what 
is the human being in the imago Dei, Saint Thomas Aquinas’s most systematic discussion of the 
issue occurs in question 93, in the first part of the Summa Theologiae, entitled: “the End or 
Term of Production of Man”. The key text from the Scripture is Genesis 1: 26-28, where it is 
said, “God created humankind in his own image.” Saint Aquinas follows Saint Augustine, in 
holding that there is an imperfect likeness of God in human being. Since the First-Born of 
creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so 
He is said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by 
reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the 
perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the image of God exists in 
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His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: 
whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin.150 
It is important to note that being of man, who is made in the image and likeness of God 
and all his activity, always points toward his destiny. This is what Aquinas means when he says, 
in man’s principles, “being, and their activities, always have goals.”151 Putting this ways, man is 
originates from God and will move toward God. Aquinas begins his treatment of the rational 
creature’s returning to God by looking at the ultimate human end: “the act of happiness.” We 
shall first consider the ultimate end of human life; and those things by means of which man is 
able to advance toward this end, or to stray from it: for the end is the rule of whatever is 
ordained to the end. Since the ultimate end of man and other rational creatures attain to their 
last end by knowing and loving God as truth and goodness that human attains their ultimate 
end (God Himself).152 God created human to be like Him by sharing in His acts of knowing and 
loving His Divine. Being the “image of God” means that men and women not only ‘exist’, but 
are capable of a relationship with God. On the one hand, then, man is connected to his world 
(‘out of the clay of the ground’), and on the other hand he is open (‘image of God’) to relating 
with God.153 Being the image of God is the basis for a relationship of intimacy with God. It is 
important to point out that being the image of God does not only refer to the human soul, but 
also to the human body.154 The Catechism of the Catholic Church states, 
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“Created in God's image and called to know and love him, the person who seeks 
God discovers certain ways of coming to know him. These are also called proofs 
for the existence of God, not in the sense of proofs in the natural sciences, but 
rather in the sense of "converging and convincing arguments", which allow us to 
attain certainty about the truth. These "ways" of approaching God from creation 
have a twofold point of departure: the physical world, and the human person.155  
 
In the human being God enters into his creation; the human being is directly related to God. 
Humans have a natural in, but on earth humans are happy by knowing and loving God through 
the natural means and, especially, through the supernatural means of faith and charity.156 Also, 
because all things participate in God’s truth and goodness, happiness includes knowing and 
loving created things, to the extent that they participate in God’s esse. As Aquinas points out, 
this knowledge and love of things causes human actions since the intellect is inclined to 
contemplate the good it attains and the will seek to rest in that which is love.157  
If we understand the starting point of moral theology to be the human person as 
created, the created human nature, who individually is man; man as created has to discover the 
way to his end. Man is in a state of potency which always remains with him. This potency has to 
be brought to perfection; ‘end’ is more than ‘goal’ or ‘objective’ (something we possess) but is 
‘telos,’ a perfection conducive to a certain nature. This perfection of potency has the character 
of transformation. We need a teleological moral theology, oriented toward an end without 
which the human person is not complete. Introduction to Moral Theology by Romanus Cessario. 
O.P., in chapter 5 mentions,  
The Church announces not only a transformation of persons but the formation of 
a communion of persons. The theological virtues dispose Christians to live in a 
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relationship with the Trinity. Prayer disposes us to them but nothing we can do 
in fact acquires them. The gifts of the Holy Spirit round out the exercise of the 
moral and theological virtues. The magnitude of heavenly bliss explains the need 
for additional divine aids to reach it.158  
 
We have a supernatural end (beatitude) that cannot be known by our natural reason. 
We have two ends but contemplation of God is the highest good. Perfection is both the 
perfection of human nature and the added good of beatitude which is not due to man. Man is 
set upon a series of ends so as to serve a highest end, both in nature and grace, which acts as 
an organizing principle of your actions. ‘Beatitude’ is a theological term for happiness. Man is 
set between God (beginning- Alpha) and God (end- Omega). God has given man stewardship 
over the moral life but not dominion over human life. Vertitatis Splendor holds that any man 
who is seeking good, ultimately must turn towards God, the fullness of goodness. This goodness 
that attracts man has its source in God, and is God himself. Only God alone is worthy of being 
loved "with all one's heart, and with all one's soul, and with all one's mind" (Matthew 22:34-
40). God is the source of man's happiness.159 In order to attain this happy life, we have only to 
look to God who supplies what we need to know about the happy life. Christian believers 
receive sure knowledge about their destiny and how to reach to it from revealed truth.  In this 
way, God's plan poses no threat to man's genuine freedom. Rather, the acceptance of God's 
plan is the only way to affirm perfect human freedom. Moreover, man has as the ultimate 
                                                        
158 Romanus Cessario, O.P., Introduction to Moral Theology, (The Catholic University of America 
Press, Washington, D.C., 2001), p. 193-227. 
159 Vatican II, Vertitatis Splendor, Pope Saint John Paul II, (6 August1993), n.9, at: 
w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/.../hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor.html.  
 50 
purpose of his life "for the praise of God's glory" (Ephesians 1: 12). Therefore, man must strive 
to make each of his actions reflect the splendor of that glory.160  
The moral life presents itself as the response due to the many gratuitous initiatives 
taken by God out of love for man.161 God, as objective beatitude, remains the End-Telos which 
regulates all moral activity; it is also stands as the origin and as the beginning of every human 
action which, when freely ruled by grace, leads to the beatific fellowship of heaven. 
Consequently, a human act is capable or not of being ordered to God and thus bring about the 
perfection of the person. An act is good if its object is in conformity with the good of the person 
according to the goods morally relevant for him. Thus, one can consider double teleology: An 
inner teleology of acting where an act is directed to promoting the true good of that particular 
person. The outer teleology where an act is capable of being ordered to its ultimate end, God. 
An act, therefore, attains its ultimate and decisive perfection when the will actually does order 
it to God through charity. As Saint Alphonsus Maria De Liguori said, "It is not enough to do good 
works; they need to be done well. For our works to be good and perfect, they must be done for 
the sole purpose of pleasing God”.162 
The Effects of the Fall and Considering of How the Image of God in Man Alienated from God. 
 
It is true that, since the fall, we find ourselves alienated from God. The root of sins 
extend back into the origin nothingness of the creature. Sin exists as the horrible tragedy of 
everything that is good in the creature. It corrupts the goodness of the movement of the agent, 
perverts his reason, deforms his natural desire for beatitude, and worst of all stands in 
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complete rebellion against the personal source of all that is of value to the sinner. As Deman 
says, it is said that sin offends God as our supreme good, and our ultimate end, as our 
benefactor, as the witness of our acts, as sovereign master, as our judge.163  
The mystery and malice of sin is nowhere more apparent than in the first sin of Adam. 
Out of His love for His creature, God had not hesitated to created him in a state of gratuitous 
justice, and enrich his nature with special benefits and aids that his way toward his ultimate 
end might be easy and attainable at minimum risk. These benefit were conferred on Adam by 
the love of God who wished to make his journey toward beatitude as easy as possible.164 This 
grace made Adam deiform and constituted in the strict supernatural order, which was later to 
be fully perfected in the beatitude of the immediate vision of God. Yet despite his free elevation 
to a participation in the divine nature and so much an intimate union of justice and sanctity 
with God that he was the very temple of his creator.165  
The fall of our first parents is vividly described in the third chapter of the book Genesis. 
The serpent, here a biblical symbol for the devil, tempted the woman to eat of the fruit of the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil with the following persuasive words: ‘No! You will not 
die! God knows in fact that on the day you eat it your eyes will be opened and you will be like 
gods, knowing good and evil’ (Gn 3:4-5) Eve then took some of the fruit of the tree and ate it. 
“She gave some also to her husband who was with her, and he ate it. The eyes of both them 
were opened and they realized that they were naked’ (Gn 3: 6-7).166 After the Fall, Adam fell 
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unworthy of being in the presence of God: ‘I was afraid because I was naked and so I hid’ (Gn 
3:10).  
The expulsion of Adam and Eve from the garden of Eden also symbolizes their interior 
separation from God.167 The realization of their nakedness is a reminder of awakening within 
Adam and Eve of concupiscence after the Fall.168 Original naked states of consciousness of man 
and woman in original innocence (Gn 2: 25) compared to that of (Gn 3:7) after the fall in which 
they realize they are naked. This realization is not a passing from “not knowing” to “knowing” 
but a change which emerges after eating from the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and 
evil (Gn: 3-11). Original nakedness signifies the original good of divine vision, through which 
man and woman see each other more fully and clearly. The shame that results carries with it a 
specific limitation of vision through the eyes in which this personal intimacy is “threatened” by 
such vision. The shame they felt before each other indicates a fear which is part of the essence 
of shame. In contrast to original nakedness, this fear of nakedness seems to express the 
awareness of being defenseless and insecure, the body is not subject to the spirit. Man of the 
body, but more precisely due to  and by motivated by concupiscence. Saint Peter Lombard in 
his work of “The Sentences”- book 2, suggests, the original sin is called the incentive sin, namely 
concupiscence or the attraction to pleasure, which is called the law of the members, or the 
weakness of nature, or the tyrant who is in our members, or law of flesh- Hence Augustine in 
the book ‘On the Baptism of Children’: “Concupiscence is in us, which must not be allowed to 




reign, there are also its desires, which are actual concupiscence: there are the weapons of the 
devil and come from weakness of nature.169  
Adam in an act of extreme pride turned his back upon God, deliberately choosing to 
disobey his Lord, to set himself up as his own final of conduct and rebel against Him from 
Whom he knew he had freely received all and in whom alone he knew he could find happiness. 
Pope Benedict XVI says in his ‘In the Beginning- A Catholic Understanding of the Story Creation 
and Fall’, temptation does not begin with denial of God but rather a doubt in His covenant, 
about the community of faith, prayer, the commandments- all of which are the context for 
living God’s covenant. By doubt the covenant of God, man makes the decision not accept the 
limitations of their existence; it is then that they decide not to be bound by the limitations 
imposed by good and evil.170  
The very heart of sin lies the human being’s denial of their creatureliness, inasmuch as 
they refuse to accept the standards and the limitations that are implicit in it. They do not want 
to be creatures, do not want to be subject to a standard, and do not want to be dependent. 
They consider their dependence on God’s creative love to be an imposition from without. But 
that is what slavery is.  and from slavery one must free oneself. Human beings themselves want 
to be God. Sin is a rejection of relationality because it wants to make the human being a god. 
Sin is loss of relationship, disturbance of relationship, and therefore it is not restricted to the 
individual. When the network of human relationships is damaged from the very  beginning, 
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then every human being enters into a world that is marked by relational damage.171 This sin of 
Adam was the cause of his children’s loss of the supernatural privileges and gift of original 
justice.172 Hence, as a result of the Fall, Adam and Eve lost the following gifts: Sanctifying grace, 
freedom from concupiscence, bodily immortality, freedom from suffering, the infused 
knowledge of certain natural and supernatural truth.173  
  When Adam transgressed the commandment two things were lost: First, he lost the 
pure possession of his nature, so lovely, created according to the image and likeness of God. 
Second, he lost the very image itself.174 The fallen person still bears the image of God, but an 
image severely marred. The human person has become a “mixed bag” of good and ill. As a 
result of the Fall, human beings have become unable to relate to God or other persons in a way 
that adequately meets vertical or horizontal needs.175 As Pope Benedict XVI says, by doubt of 
God’s covenant and not accepting the limitations as a creature, the sin of man is to destroy his 
relationship with God. Since the relationship with creation has been damaged, only the Creator 
himself can be our savior. We can be saved only when He from whom we have cut ourselves off 
takes the initiative with us and stretches out his hand to us. Only Being loved is Being saved, 
and only God’s love can purify damaged human love and radically reestablish the network of 
relationship that have suffered from alienation.176 
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As we talk about the moral theology, the human person as created to discover the way 
to his end. Even though man had sinned against God, God continued to love man. He wanted 
Adam and Eve and all their descendants to live in his friendship. After the Fall, God promised to 
send us a Redeemer, someone who would be able to reconcile us to God and restore to our 
soul the life of grace. God told the devil that this Redeemer would come from a woman, and: “I 
will put enmity (mutual hatred) between you and the woman, and between your offspring and 
hers; He will strike at your head, while you strike at his heel.”177 (Gen 3: 15). Christ came to 
make a new world. He came into the world to regenerate it in Himself, to make a new 
beginning, to be a new creation of God, to gather together in one, and recapitulate all things in 
Himself.178 As we stated above, being an intelligent creature, man enjoys being as a human 
being and also enjoys being in the Kingdom of God, which is man’s destination. The journey 
toward this goal is fulfilled through the Incarnation Word (Logos), the Perfect Image. N. W. 
Porteous observes, "Nothing could make clearer the tremendous impact of the revelation of 
God in Christ than the fact that it has almost completely obliterated the thought of man as 
being in the image of God and replaced it with the thought of Christ as being the Image of 
God.".179 The biblical narrative of the imago Dei that climaxes with the glorified new humanity 
sharing in the divine image contains a another component as well. The new humanity already 
shares in the divine image through being "in Christ."180 Saint Irenaeus perceived the biblical 
truth that it is first and foremost God the Son who is the perfect image and likeness of God the 
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Father, and for us to be created in the image and likeness of God is be created in the image and 
likeness of the Son. The begetting of the eternal Son by the Father is the prototype and the 
archetype for the Father creating us through and in the likeness of his Son.181 The begetting of 
the eternal Son by the Father is the prototype and the archetype for the Father creating us 
through and in the likeness of his Son. So, if human being are created in the image of the Son 
through the creative activity of the same Son, then it is the Son to whom the Father will entrust 
the work of ensuring that human being attain the fullness and completion of that image and 
likeness.”182 As the Son is the eternal incorruptible image of the Father, so those who are 
created in the Son’s image must also assume divine incorruptibility.”183  
St. Paul in his letter to Colossians 1:15-20 describes the work of Christ has important 
implications for the motif of creation and redemption.  
He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation. For in him were created 
all things in heaven and on earth, the visible and the invisible, whether thrones or 
dominions or principalities or powers; all things were created through him and for him. 
He is before all things, and in him all things hold together. He is the head of the body, 
the church. He is the beginning, the firstborn from the dead, that in all things he himself 
might be preeminent. For in him all the fullness was pleased to dwell, and through him 
to reconcile all things for him, making peace by the blood of his cross [through him], 
whether those on earth or those in heaven.184 (Colossians 1:15-20)   
 
Overall, vv. 15–20 forms the core of the primary theological message of the letter to the 
Colossians. The Colossians need to focus on the headship of Christ over Creation and the 
Church, that is, on Christ the Creator and ruler over all authorities, and on Christ the reconciler, 
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incarnate, crucified and raised, and so recreating the world. Salvation for all is found in having 
this knowledge, and submitting to him, producing the obedience spoken throughout the letter. 
It can be clearly seen that just in the opening chapter of Colossians, Jesus alone is God and all of 
God’s fullness dwells in Him. He is the Redeemer, He is sovereign, He is the creator, He is the 
sustainer of all things, He is the head of all things, He is the fullness of Deity, He is the 
peacemaker between God and man, and He is all in all. He is the procession of the Word 
occurring by the way of intellectual operation, He proceeds according to likeness-by the way of 
nature of Godhead. The key concepts in which Paul’s  Christology are formulated in this hymn 
are significant in various ways in the relationship between creation and redemption. Since Jesus 
may be described as "in the form of God", He is the Image of God, thus fulfilling man's destiny 
and making manifest in this world the glory of God. It is further important that the divine 
splendour was made manifest only in the deepest identification with man, for only by "taking 
the form of a servant" was Jesus "in the form of God". These two forms of Jesus' activity stand 
in sharp contrast to the grasping and self-assertiveness of the first Adam, who represents 
mankind as a whole. Thus Jesus became the one through whom God's redemptive purpose is 
accomplished within creation.185  
We now turn back to Saint Thomas and his doctrine of the redemption that is based on 
the relationship which the Incarnation establishes between Christ and men. For Aquinas, the 
love of God for human beings is unconditional and the Incarnation is essentially redemptive. 
Certainly, as Augustine had said, God could have saved us in a different way, since all things are 
                                                        
185 John G. Gibbs, the Relationship Between Creation and Redemption According to Phil II 5: 11: 
A journal of Catholic understand and culture, Novum Testamentum, (1970), Vol.12(3), pp.270-
283, p. 282. 
 58 
subject to him; but no other way was more fitting for the healing of our wretchedness.186 The 
only consideration of the Incarnation as necessary is based on the hypothesis that God chose to 
redeem man in the most perfect way. On the one hand, the Incarnation was a most efficacious 
help for man to attain beatitude because it helped to close the gap that existed between 
humanity and divinity. It aided man to know certain truths about God in a way that was 
intelligible for man’s mode of knowing reality.187 On the other hand, the Incarnation of the 
Word is ordered to full participation in the divinity which is the true happiness of man; St. 
Thomas (in III, q.1, a.2) cites a sermon attributed to St. Augustine: “God became man in order 
that man might become God.”188  
St Thomas Aquinas considered humanity’s sin as a violation of God’s justice; therefore, 
punishment and chastisement must be done as a repayment. Aquinas therefore said that since 
everywhere in the sacred Scriptures the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason for the 
Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was 
ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not 
have been.189 The harmonious relationship between God and humankind had been disrupted 
by sin, because sin has a certain character of infinity about it because of the infinity of the 
divine majesty. In order for human satisfaction to be on a level equivalent to sin, there has to 
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be an act of satisfaction of infinite efficacy.190 St. Thomas Aquinas states as the reason for the 
fittingness of the Incarnation in view of the redemption: 
Man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has 
been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not 
be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also 
because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of 
the Divine majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more 
grievous the offense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act 
of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and 
man.191  
 
There was no way for the human race to correct the destroyed relationship. God had to take 
the initiative. The term that describes how human beings can be reconciled to God is 
atonement. Atonement refers to the forgiveness of sins through the death and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ. The end effect of atonement is the reconciliation between God and his creation. 
The Dogmatic Constitution of the Church states in Gaudium et Spes that only in the 
mystery of the Incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, 
was a figure of Him who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the new Adam, by the 
revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and 
makes his supreme calling clear. It is not surprising, then, that in Him all the aforementioned 
truths find their root and attain their crown.192 God's Power is made more manifest through the 
Incarnation. God took from our corrupt and defeated nature in order to defeat its conqueror.193 
His Passion causes salvation as a fully adequate satisfaction for man’s injustice. Any action of 
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Jesus could have been sufficient to redeem us since these actions have infinite value (Theandric 
action). Yet the Father willed that redemption would come about through the redemption of 
his son. Because his Passion was accepted with perfect love, it was more pleasing to the Father 
more than the sins of men were displeasing. In agreement with Aquinas, Scotus insisted that 
the Incarnation would have happened even if there were no fall. This would have been done to 
"crown" creation. 
 The Incarnation is the apex of creation and the fullest revelation of God's love for man. 
Nothing in creation possesses the capacity of itself to be assumed by God, so the assumption of 
human nature in the Incarnation is completely gratuitous and unmerited. What we have by 
nature is obediently potency: the ability to be assumed if God chooses to do it (it's passive to 
us). The assumption of human nature is appropriate for man in light of our need for salvation. It 
was the best way God could have saved man. As Saint Augustine said, God could have chosen 
to save mankind by someone not of the race of Adam, but he judged it more appropriate to 
conquer the enemy of the human race by a member of the conquered race. Since God chose to 
require satisfaction, the Incarnation becomes necessary in this sense that only God can pay our 
infinite debt. Such is the mystery of man, and it is a great one, as seen by believers in the light 
of Christian revelation. Through Christ and in Christ, the riddles of sorrow and death become 
meaningful. Apart from His Gospel, they overwhelm us. Christ has risen, destroying death by 
His death; He has lavished life upon us so that, as sons in the Son, we can cry out in the Spirit; 
Abba, Father.194  
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In sum, an image originates from what it imagines and resembles the original in a way 
characteristic of its species. God created man in His image, ‘Let us make humankind in our 
image, according to our likeness’ (Genesis 1:26). This image of God in man, of course, remains 
infinitely distant from the original, God. The image of God in man is an instrumental sign, a sign 
which points beyond itself towards God, and also a formal sign, reveals something about the 
original. Since the Trinitarian God is the agent of creation, then all creation bears in some way 
the image of God according to the nature of each creation. The image of God in man signifies 
both the divine nature of God and the divine Persons. The processions of the Word of God and 
Holy Spirit proceed by way of God’s self- knowing and self-loving. In a similar fashion, the image 
of God in the human nature can be described in two ways: in our acts of self-knowledge and 
self-love and our acts of knowing and loving God. The imago Dei in man is after the pattern of 
the Logos (Word, Son) who is the exemplar and extrinsic cause (formal but not intrinsic cause). 
The imago Dei is found primarily in man’s immaterial powers, i.e. the intellect and will. Bearing 
the divine image and likeness make man intimately related to God. Additionally, the power of 
intellect also motivates the human person to love God and other fellow human beings. Being an 
intelligent creature, man enjoys being as a human being and also enjoys being in the Kingdom 
of God, which is man’s destination. The journey toward this goal is fulfilled through the 
Incarnation Word, the Perfect Image. The image of God, in man, is partially shared with this 
Perfect Image, the First-born, without whom man cannot possibly attain his destination. That 
Perfect Image is the Christ who redeems man from weakness (sins) his perfect likeness, so as to 
complete the journey toward human being’s goal- Beatific Vision.  
Conclusion 
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We have considered the basic points that Aquinas makes in his account of the 
Incarnation: that Christ is divine with all that that involves; that he is human, with all that that 
involves; that his human nature is united in person but not in nature; that neither is properly 
thought of as a part.195 He cites the formula of the Council of Chalcedon: The Son of God 
appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without 
separation; the distinction of natures not having been taken away by the union, St Thomas 
Aquinas reaffirms that the union could not have taken place in the nature of Christ, because 
this would make the union accidental rather than essential, and dissolves the absolute unity 
into relative unity. Our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one 
and the same only-begotten Son and Word of God. Therefore the union took place in the 
Person. The Word subsists in the human nature, receiving no addition or change. In our Lord 
Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis. The subsistence of the human 
nature is the subsistence of the Word. The subsistence is distinct from the human nature 
because it's a pre-existent subsistence. In Christ, the union of the divine and human nature is 
Hypostatic, that is, united in the Person of the Word. The acting subject of apostolic testimony 
is the One Lord Jesus Christ who is Begotten of the Father. Though the two natures remain 
unconfused in the union (Chalcedon), they belong to one and the same Lord. Christ as a Divine 
Person who has one substance and one act of existence (esse). And only as true God and true 
man in the unity of his Person is Christ the mediator of salvation.  
The only consideration of the Incarnation as necessary is based on the hypothesis that 
God chose to redeem man in the most perfect way. On the one hand, the Incarnation was a 
                                                        
195 Gorman, Aquinas on the Metaphysics of the Hypostatic Union, p. 52 
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most efficacious help for man to attain beatitude because it helped to close the gap that 
existed between humanity and divinity. It aided man to know certain truths about God in a way 
that was intelligible for man’s mode of knowing reality. On the other hand, the Incarnation of 
the Word is ordered to full participation in the divinity which is the true happiness of man; St. 
Thomas (in III, q.1, a.2) cites a sermon attributed to St. Augustine: ‘God became man in order 
that man might become God.’  
The mystery of the Incarnation is a way of expressing God's gratuitous love for 
humanity. It is the great event that brings salvation to people. It is one of the unique events of 
God's saving work. On the other hand, the Incarnation is a humble journey in which the Second 
Person of the Blessed Trinity abandons the glory of God, becomes mortal, enters and 
encapsulates human nature to live like mortals, except for sin. St. John the Evangelist faithfully 
portrayed God's love for humanity. He describes it as follows: ‘In this way the love of God was 
revealed to us: God sent the only begotten Son into the world so that we might have life 
through him" ( 1 Jn 4, 9). Indeed, the Incarnation is the greatest manifestation of the love God 
has bestowed upon humanity. Since, "God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that 
whosoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life" (Jn 3:16). 
In addition, in this greatest love  expressed in the mystery of the Incarnation, the human 
being participates in the same human nature with Jesus. Therefore, the Incarnation is also the 
embodiment of the God of Love, because Christ is the gift of God to mankind - through Him - 
salvation is bestowed both individually and for all humanity. The greatest love that God has for 
man is to know God as Love through the Incarnation of the Word. It is by the Word of  God 
made man that man can approach God to the greatest extent. Therefore, in Christ or in the 
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Incarnate Word, God reveals His gratuitous love to the fullest. That is, God's will and the way of 
salvation are completely free, especially that He is absolutely free in choosing the way to do it. 
To this point, St. Thomas affirms that the Incarnation of the Word is God’s love for men, 
demonstrated to man in no way more effective than this: He willed to be united to man in 
person, for it is proper for the lover to be united to the beloved so far as possible. Therefore, it 
was necessary for man tending to perfect beatitude that God become man.”196  
The image of the human being has been tarnished by sin. In other words, the dignity of 
the human person has lost his great dignity when Adam sinned. As Gaudium et Spes of the 
Second Vatican points out: “The truth is that only in the mystery of the Incarnate Word does 
the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him who was to 
come, namely Christ the Lord. Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the 
Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself and makes his supreme calling clear.”197 
The Word of God came into the world to restore the image of man. The dignity of the person or 
the mystery of man "is truly revealed only in the mystery of the Incarnate Word".198 Man can 
only fulfill his life's destiny and reach the fullness in Christ: “For by His Incarnation the Son of 
God has united Himself in some fashion with every man. He worked with human hands, He 
thought with a human mind, acted by human choice and loved with a human heart. Born of the 
Virgin Mary, He has truly been made one of us, like us in all things except sin.”199 The image of 
God, in man, is partially shared with this Perfect Image, the First-born, without whom man 
                                                        
196 Summa contra Gentiles, IV, ch. 54. 




cannot possibly attain his destination. That Perfect Image is the Christ who redeems man from 
weakness (sins), his perfect likeness, so as to complete the journey toward human being’s goal - 
the Beatific Vision. “It was, then, most suitable for God to assume human nature to stir up 
man’s hope for beatitude. Hence, after the Incarnation of Christ, men began the more to aspire 
after heavenly beatitude; as He Himself says: “I have come that they may have life and may 
have it more abundantly” (John 10:10).200 Therefore, the Incarnate Word made man lift himself 
into sharing in the divine nature of God and allowing them to live in an intimate relationship 
with God Father through Jesus Christ, our Lord. 
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